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Contemporary democracy is often thought to have its roots in ancient Greece. However as Jørgen
Møller writes, many of the key aspects of modern representative democracy can be traced to the
medieval period. He argues that while genuine democratisation was a feature of the 19th and 20th
centuries in Europe, this transition took place against the backdrop of medieval constitutional
institutions.
Madame de Staël famously observed that in France liberty is ancient and despotism is modern. The
sentiment behind this observation has been echoed by a large body of scholarship that has
identiﬁed the roots of key aspects of modern representative democracy in medieval political institutions. Most
important on the list is the medieval development of representative institutions. As is frequently pointed out, the most
famous modern parliament – the English one convening in Westminster – can be traced in an unbroken line to the
parliament that arose under Plantagenet kings in the 13th and 14th centuries.
The notion that modern democracy has medieval roots was forcefully formulated by the Prussian historian Otto
Hintze in a series of essay written from 1929 to 1931. Hintze went so far as to argue that the absolutism that swept
away constitutionalism over much of Latin Christendom following the 16th century military revolution was in fact only
a temporary aberration from a development which led from medieval parliaments to modern, representative
democracy. More recently, Brian M. Downing has been almost as vocal. He argues that modern democracy evolved
straight from what he terms “medieval constitutionalism” in the instances where early modern absolutism did not
sweep away these medieval institutions (say, in England).
Most of us would probably ﬁnd Hintze’s and Downing’s direct link between medieval institutions and modern
democracy untenable. Genuine democratisation is a feature of the late 19th and early 20th century, and it
presupposed the removal of a series of political privileges of medieval origins. For instance, the medieval
representative institutions had only catered to select elite interests and the introduction of equal and universal
suﬀrage required mass pressure from below aimed at tearing down the old notions of political hierarchy in favour of
new notions of political equality. In this sense, modern representative democracy required the great broom which –
in Karl Marx’s famous phrase – swept away the medieval trash.
Nonetheless, we can still make the case that this this subsequent democratisation was easier against the backdrop
of medieval constitutional institutions than it would otherwise have been. There are at least two reasons for this.
First, as the late Robert A. Dahl observed in Democracy and Its Critics, when the modern forces behind
democratisation built up steam, “the design for a ‘representative’ legislature did not have to be spun from gossamer
ﬁbres of abstract democratic ideas; concrete legislatures and representatives, undemocratic though they were,
already existed”. Second, out of the medieval chrysalis emerged a society with quasi-independent social domains in
which newly emerging groups could ﬁnd niches within which to organise, thereby paving the way for the vibrant civil
societies that came to characterise especially Western Europe. This furthered the ability of these groups to ﬁght for
their own enfranchisement once democratisation began to build up steam.
Thus, while the path leading from medieval institutions to modern representative democracy may have been strewn
with obstacles, it still presented a more accessible route than other historical paths. Most students of
democratisation would probably acknowledge as much today. No similar consensus exists about how medieval
institutions aﬀected subsequent state-building processes. If we return to Downing’s account, modern state-building
1/3
Credit: Nick Rowland (CC-BY-SA-3.0)
is construed as a process which consists of removing the medieval institutions of constraints. Where the medieval
institutions were swept away by state-building, military-bureaucratic absolutism came into existence.
In a more sophisticated analysis, Thomas Ertman
has pointed out that the survival of constitutionalist
institutions had no eﬀect on whether state-building
was based on bureaucratic (i.e. ‘Weberian’) or
patrimonial templates. These two positions nicely
capture the general views in the literature which
might be said to be that the medieval foundations of
democracy were either inconsequential or outright
negative for a felicitous pattern of state-building: that
is, for the introduction of modern bureaucratic
institutions.
Analogously to what has been said about modern
democracy, it is correct that modern state-building
entailed that a number of medieval institutions were
removed, most particularly local institutions of self-
government and privileges for estate groups such as
tax exemptions. However, the literature has largely
ignored that the medieval institutions that needed to
be transformed to pave the way for modern bureaucratic ones also aﬀected subsequent state-building in a positive
way. There are two main reasons for this.
First, the medieval institutions and the strong social groups which they reﬂected constantly constrained state-
builders, thereby making top-down state-building and arbitrary rule more diﬃcult. To use Michael Mann’s distinction,
this facilitated the use of infrastructural power at the expense of despotic power. Second, many of the medieval
institutions provided “transmission belts” for modern state-building while the strong social groups could be
harnessed for state-building. For instance, local bureaucracies owed much to earlier structures of urban self-
government and a part of the medieval legacy was the existence of a stratum of professional groups of corporate
origins which could staﬀ the new bureaucratic structures.
One reason why these positive eﬀects have been ignored is that most prior scholarship on the development of the
modern state has been Eurocentric in the sense that it is variation within Europe that has been addressed. This, for
instance, is the case in both of the above-mentioned analyses by Downing and Ertman – but it also characterises
most of the more general ‘bellicist’ work on the relationship between war-making and state-making, including the
seminal work of Charles Tilly. However, as all of Western and Central Europe embarked on modern state-building
against the backdrop of the medieval institutions, this is a sure recipe for emphasising the blocking aspects of the
medieval legacy at the expense of the facilitating aspects.
The proper way to appreciate the eﬀects of the medieval legacy is by comparing processes of state-building in
cases with and without this legacy. Perhaps the most intuitively interesting comparative contrast is Russia. In the
Russian case state-building was sparked by the very same factor that spurred state-building in the rest of Europe,
namely the geopolitical pressure that had become a ubiquitous feature of the European multi-state system after
1500.
A closer look at Russian state-building shows just how diﬃcult it is to establish bureaucratic institutions top-down by
unconstrained rulers in the absence of existing “transmission belts” for authority. Not only were there no extant
institutions of self-government to base local government structures on, even the central institutions established by
czars such as Peter the Great were constantly undermined because real power subsided not in formal institutions
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but in patron-client networks centred on the czar. In this sense, Russia serves to put in relief some of the facilitating
aspects of medieval institutions of constraints for the later development of bureaucratic institutions.
The study of these medieval foundations has received renewed attention by social scientists in recent decades.
Most important is probably the ambitious research agenda of Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson which, at least
tacitly, rests on the assumption that medieval “institutions of constraints” – whether they arose endogenously or
were transplanted during colonialisation processes – have facilitated modern democratisation and modern
economic growth.
A next step for this research agenda is to, in a more detailed manner, analyse the importance of these medieval
institutions for state-building. If we wish to understand which lessons can be derived from the European
development of modern democracy, the modern state, and the modern market economy, we need to understand
both blocking and facilitating aspects of the legacy bequeathed by medieval institutions. Only by doing so can we
derive lessons from European development, which might then serve to shed some new light on ongoing processes
of political change and state-building elsewhere.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: For a longer discussion of the topic covered in this article see the author’s recent article in the Journal of
Democracy. The article originally appeared at our partner site, Democratic Audit, and gives the views of the author,
not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
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